War Preparation Requires Obedience

War - Part 3 of 4

This is but a dramatic way of pointing out that man has the unique ability to communicate ideas, to share abstract mental processes through a common catalogue of language and writing symbols.

As thinking beings we are aware of our mortality. We take active steps to enjoy our limited existence to the fullest of our ability. We symbolize extensively in the organization of a society for efficient pursuit of enjoyment.

When this pursuit brings us into conflict with other societies hostile to our goals we employ highly specialized symbols to organize, a "war" of death against them. In order to kill, conscience free, we symbolize our enemy as near beasts; or at least considerably less human than ourselves.

In civilized societies, the arms-bearers and the decision-makers have been quite different groups. However, we seem to have reached a level of sophistication where the potential fighters are becoming reluctant to accept leadership decision. Probably this is due to the complexity of our society and the interdependence of nations today.

Abstract goals are hard to understand. We have developed communication to the point that we can understand a direct attack, but not preventive wars.

The people of advanced countries also are fearful that the consequences of pushing a careless and desperate enemy armed with nuclear bombs will be total destruction. In the past, even the most lethal wars did not threaten annihilation of the human species.

If all members of our society are to share intelligently in decisions for starting, conducting and ending wars all must be aware of the symbolic processes that lead us to the battlefield. Only with knowledge can those who will be obliged to serve in the front lines consciously influence our leaders.

A significant contribution to our understanding of the "Psychological Preparations for War" was made recently by Anthony F. C. Wallace, chairman of the anthropology department of the University of Pennsylvania. His paper of that title was part of a symposium on "Armed Conflict" at Washington, D.C.

The principal psychological preparation for war is the training of all members of a society to participate efficiently in a social process which Wallace calls mobilization, as distinguished from relaxation.

In order for a society to shift from the relaxed to the mobilized state, the population must receive a "releasing stimulus," in response to which everyone promptly disposes himself according to plan.

It is also obviously desirable although not necessary -- that the mobilizing signal stir an emotional, as well as a disciplined, desire for action.

"The releasing stimulus is therefore apt to be a report that a certain kind of event has occurred to which people with (similar) character type will respond with anger," says Wallace.

"For twentieth century Americans, the symbolically arousing stimulus is apt to be the report that helpless Americans, or their allies, are being held prisoner or are under attack and must be rescued."

The Vietnam and Korean wars are obvious examples of Wallace's thesis. A call to save our Asian friends triggered our entry into these wars by presidents who likely were motivated more by a belief that Red China is a probable menace to our way of life.

"It is important to note," says Wallace, "that this embellishment of the releasing stimulus is not, and cannot be, necessary to ensure mobilization. A population is composed of persons with a variety of character structures and personal motives, many with limited intelligence and others suffering from greater or lesser degrees of psychopathology, and mobilization must proceed independent of private motive.

"Hence, atrocity stories, scare reports, and the like are never adequate to ensure mobilization; indeed, in some situations, such as medical emergencies, they appear to interfere with it. Thus, the intensity of the emotion aroused must not be so high as to preoccupy the person being mobilized; the symbol must function more as a rationalization or personal sacrifice than as a stimulus toward unrestrained violence or flight."

It is apparent that fear of atomic weapons has blunted our enthusiasm for war.

The shift from the relaxed to the mobilized state must be taken by people who have already learned what to do in response to the releasing stimulus, according to Wallace.

In all societies this learning probably occurs early in life and largely without formal instruction in the course of the child's living through the alternating states of relaxation and mobilization. He learns by constant observation and participation.

One critically necessary feature of this learning is the development of a readiness to move from a situation characterized by considerable personal freedom, to automatic and strict obedience to authority.

The signal for war must be given by a person or group recognized as having the responsibility to do so when the situation arises.

In the United States that responsibility lies theoretically with Congress. In practice, however, the president issues the call to war and we always have responded. Our Constitution cloaks the president with highest authority as "commander in chief," and we are conditioned to obey him in that role.

Instant, positive response is necessary if a society is to survive a physical aggression. Wallace points out, though, that sometimes the authorized body communicates the war Signal even when no serious attack is threatened. The society mobilizes, begins to, use lethal weapons and initiates an extremely costly and sometimes fatal conflict.

Wallace contends that "unwanted wars " and most wars are now unwanted " occur as a result of a perversion of administrative process rather than as a result of popular folly."

"The types and sources of such perversions are complex," declares Wallace. "In some cases, the psychopathology of administrative personnel is evidently responsible, the case of Nazi Germany is the best example of this type.

"In other cases, responsible and intelligent administrators attempting to act in the best long-term interests of their society are precipitated by misinformation, communication failures, and a rigid, poorly designed system of decision-making into unnecessarily mobilizing the society for war.

"From, this point of view, it would appear that the administrative structure of any society is extraordinarily vulnerable to perversion in regard to war decisions," states Wallace.

Continued